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1 Introduction
The procurement of goods and services such as transport services has an inherent
dynamic aspect. When contracting for a service today, the procurer needs to take
into account that there will also be a need to (re-)contract for a similar service in the
future. This paper takes into account this dynamic aspect of procurement and studies
the effects of financial constraints and bankruptcy risk on the optimal procurement
contract.
In the case of public transport, a firm needs to make and maintain investments in
competence and equipment before being eligible to bid for contracts. This generally
keeps the number of bidders low. In late 2008, the Norwegian Health Authority was
looking for contractors for medical transport in Finnmark, Norway. The number of
bidders was very low and two out of three areas that were up for procurement went
to Veolia, a strong player in the Norwegian transport sector, and the last area was
contracted out to Loppa Legeskyssb˚ater, a small, local firm which, because of this
contract, survived and ensured future competition in the local market.1 Furthermore,
in 2011 in Tromsø in northern Norway, the regional provider, Cominor, lost the
competition for bus routes to a large national provider. This loss accounted for
about 50% of the production for Cominor and subsequently led to the firm exiting
the local market in Tromsø.2
This paper focuses on procurement where the change in the number of competi-
tors is a result of small or financially weak firms leaving the market because they
cannot maintain the investment in competence and equipment without the support
of external investors.3 In the 2007 Observatory of EU Small and Medium-sized En-
1http://www.altaposten.no/lokalt/nyheter/article203130.ece and
http://www.helse-finnmark.no/pressemeldinger/ambulansekontrakt-til-loppa-legeskyss
baater-article60750-25745.html. Furthermore, Loppa Legeskyssb˚ater was given a
longer contracting period than Veolia in order to ensure “predictability in the competition”
(http://www.altaposten.no/lokalt/nyheter/article203131.ece).
2http://www.nrk.no/nordnytt/cominor-tapte-anbudet-i-tromso-1.7619509 and
http://www.itromso.no/nyheter/trafikk/article451776.ece.
3Which for simplicity will be called bankruptcy, but could potentially include exit only from the
specific market in question.
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terprises (SMEs)4, 21% of SMEs indicated that accessing finance was a problem.5 In
a setting where a small firm faces bankruptcy risk because of its limited access to
financial markets, future competition is more likely to be maintained when biasing
the procurement design in favor of this firm. However, it is not clear what form
such a bias should take and, because biasing is costly, whether this is even optimal.
This paper analyzes how and when leveling the playing field between small and big
firms in public procurement is optimal. It also contributes to the analysis of the
optimality of the US Small Business Act which explicitly favors small firms, and the
EU principle of equal treatment across bidders.6
In a two-period setting, the optimal first-period procurement contract exhibits
a trade-off between reduced first-period costs by giving the big firm incentives to
understate its cost in order to push the small firm out of the market (predation) and
increased future competition by favoring the small firm. Second-period procurement
always unambiguously favors the small firm by evaluating its cost more leniently
than how it would evaluate the same cost announcement by the big firm. This
paper further shows that when the procurement agency can either provide funding
for the small firm or when the procurement agency can allow the investor to make
his contract contingent on the actual realization of the future procurement contract,
then the negative spillover effects from the small firm’s financial contract disappear
and the procurement agency should treat the two firms equally.
The small firm’s financing problem makes use of Faure-Grimaud (2000) who shows
that an optimal financial contract takes the form of debt contract in which a firm
that is not capable of reimbursing a fixed amount faces a risk of bankruptcy. Here
this result is applied to the case where profits are endogenously determined by an
equilibrium procurement mechanism. That is, if the small firm doesn’t perform well
enough in the first period, it risks bankruptcy. This gives incentives to the big firm
4http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/analysis/observatory_en.htm
5Berger and Udell (2003) and references therein provide evidence of small firms having less access
to financial markets than bigger firms.
6The US Small Business Act also includes minority- and women-owned businesses, companies lo-
cated in disadvantaged areas and veteran-owned businesses. However, this paper focuses exclusively
on small firms.
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to understate its cost so that it can obtain a higher share of the initial market and
increase the likelihood of becoming a monopoly provider in the second period. This
paper looks at how to strategically design the procurement contract to balance the
trade-off between reduced first-period payments by allowing the big firm to behave
aggressively to push the small firm out of the market and increased future efficiency
and competition by favoring the small firm.
In this paper, although in future procurements (second period), by construction,
all active firms are symmetric in terms of financial weakness, the small firm should
still receives a larger share of the contract than when the competition is between
two financially equal firms. This is because favoring this firm in the second period
allows the procurement agency to optimally exploit the big firm’s first-period be-
havior. This paper therefore provides a dynamic optimality rationale for continued
favoritism of small firms in auctions. In this sense it differs from previous literature
(Branco (1994), Vagstad (1995), and Rezende (2009)) where favoritism stems from
the procurement agency having a preference for one of the bidders. Furthermore, this
result arises because initial financial asymmetries affect how the procurement agency
evaluates firms’ bids. The model also allows for cost asymmetries and when the small
firm also faces higher costs7, then the share of the contract that it gets might fur-
ther be to its advantage (as in Myerson (1981), McAfee and McMillan (1989), and
Maskin and Riley (2000)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2.
Section 3 solves the benchmark procurement contract when firms are not financially
constrained. The main results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 briefly
concludes and discusses the findings.
2 The model
• Players and preferences: In period i, i ∈ {1, 2}, the procurement agency wants
to divide the production of an amount q¯i of a certain good between the two firms.
7Which might justify why the firm is small in the first place.
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It enjoys a gross surplus S¯i from the provision of such a service in period i.
There are two firms that have the ability to provide the good. However, there
is a fixed cost D > 0 to be paid before the first period.8 Upon payment, this cost
is sunk and nonrecoverable. Ex ante the firms differ in that the small firm does
not have enough internal funds to self-finance D. This firm is therefore called the
cash-constrained firm. The big firm does not need external financing to finance the
fixed cost D and will for this reason be called the self-financed firm. I.e., the self-
financed firm has a deep pocket and internal funds while the cash-constrained firm
has a shallow pocket and needs an investor to finance it in order to participate in the
procurement mechanism.9
In each period i, a firm k’s cost of procuring the required amount q of the good
is C(θik, q) ≡ θikq +
µ
2
q2 where µ ≥ 0.10 The parameter µ is industry specific
and is therefore common to all firms. Its value is public knowledge. But θik is
private information and independent across time and firms11 and will sometimes
be referred to as the firm’s type. Furthermore, I allow costs to be drawn from
different distributions characterized by the cumulative distribution functions Fk(·)
with support Θ = [θ, θ¯].12 The associated density function is denoted fk(·). Define
∆θ ≡ θ¯ − θ. It is assumed that the inverse hazard rate Fk
fk
is increasing. To account
for the fact that the small firm may have a lower cost distribution than the big
firm, Assumption 1 imposes reverse hazard dominance of FS as in Maskin and Riley
8D is a participation cost. It can either be thought of as a cost to invest in the necessary
equipment or prototypes to prove that a firm is competent for the task in question or it can be
thought of as an administrative cost associated with the bids.
9If the self-financed firm is the incumbent and D is an entry cost, then D is already sunk for
the self-financed firm and only the cash-constrained firm needs to pay and finance this cost.
10The results in this paper hold for a more general cost function C(θik, q) (see the working paper
version of this article).
11Because firms differ in their organization, size and style, an economic shock can impact each
firm in different ways. For instance, if one firm uses a lot of energy-intensive capital, it will be
affected differently by a change in the cost of energy than a firm that relies less on energy-intensive
capital. Therefore, depending on the general state of the economy, a firm that is more efficient
today, is not necessarily more efficient tomorrow. It is therefore assumed that firms are impacted
by idiosyncratic shocks between periods.
12In full generality the supports could also differ. However, to alleviate notations the support is
the same for the two distributions.
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(2000).
Assumption 1.
FC(θ)
fC(θ)
≤
FS(θ)
fS(θ)
, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (1)
For ease of notation, denote by C the cash-constrained firm and S the self-financed
firm. Furthermore, define θi ≡ (θiC , θiS), i ∈ {1, 2}.
The investment market is assumed to be competitive. Therefore a firm seeking
funding has all the bargaining power when it comes to the details of the financial
contract.13
Remark: This paper focuses on the case of a sufficiently small D. Indeed, if D
is large enough, a natural monopoly situation is preferable. This paper focuses on
situations where competition is beneficial, but fragile because the small firm is cash-
constrained. Of course profits from the procurement stage are endogenous, but in
what follows it will be assumed that the (endogenous) expected value of participating
in the market is higher than the up-front cost D. For instance, ignoring financial
asymmetries, D needs to be smaller than FS
fS
(θ¯) q¯1+q¯2
2
.
Furthermore, it is assumed that S¯i is sufficiently high so that even if there is only
one provider, it is optimal to provide q¯i. This means that S¯i > C(θ¯, q¯i), i ∈ {1, 2}.
• First-Best Procurement: Without asymmetric information and no financial- or
costs constraints, the procurement agency offers a contract {q1C(θ1), q1S(θ1), t1C(θ1), t1S(θ1),
{q2C(θ2), q2S(θ2), t2C(θ2), t2S(θ2)}} that solves the following optimization problem
14
max
(tik(·),qik(·))i=1,2,k=C,S
Eθ1,θ2
[∑
i=1,2
(
S¯i − tiC(θi)− tiS(θi)
)]
13As pointed out in Faure-Grimaud (1997) in the opposite case, when the investor has all the
bargaining power, the optimal financial contract remains the qualitatively same.
14In full generality, second-period variables should also depend on θ1. With independence of
costs across periods this will not be the case for the optimal contract. To simplify notations, this
contingency is therefore ignored and will also be ignored in the rest of the exposition.
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subject to
Πik(θi) = tik(θi)− C (θik, qik(θi)) ≥ 0,
qiS(θi) = q¯i − qiC(θi),
where i ∈ {1, 2}, k ∈ {C, S}.
Observe that since gross surplus is constant, maximizing expected intertemporal
net surplus amounts to minimizing expected total cost. Note also that in this paper
the procurement agency is constrained to offer only contracts that yields positive
profits for each period’s procurement.15
It is straightforward to check that without asymmetric information and no fi-
nancial constraints, productive efficiency requires that whenever possible each firm
produces at the same marginal cost.16 Formally qiC(θi) is such that
MC (θiC , qiC(θi)) =MC (θiS, q¯i − qiC(θi)) , (2)
where MC(θik, q) ≡
∂C(θik ,q)
∂q
, k ∈ {C, S}, i ∈ {1, 2}.
This is illustrated in the following figure.
15This amounts to taking a conservative stance on the 1924 US Supreme Court ruling in the case
Texas Railroad Comm. v. Eastern Texas R.R. Co. which states that a regulatory agency cannot
force a firm to provide a good or a service at a loss (see Spiegel and Spulber (1994)). As will become
clear when asymmetric information is introduced, this does not mean that firms do not consider
intertemporal profits in their decision making.
16This is the case when θ¯ < µq¯i.
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qiC = 0
qiS = q¯i
qiC
MC(θiC , qiC)
qiC = q¯i
qiS = 0
qiS
MC(θiS , qiS)
qFBiC (θi)
qFBiS (θi)
Figure 1: Optimal first-best provision rule (θiS > θiC)
If one firm is inherently more efficient than the other so that (2) does not have a
solution in [0, q¯i], then the optimal strategy for the procurement agency is to select
sole sourcing from the most efficient firm. Since the focus of this paper is on the effect
of financial constraints rather than the optimality of dual sourcing, in the sequel I
will focus on the case where dual sourcing is optimal.17
Because total quantity in each period is fixed, there can be no distortion of
this quantity. This paper therefore focuses on the allocative role of asymmetric
information and financial structure on the distribution of quantities across firms.
3 Benchmark: No financial constraints
As a benchmark, assume that there are no financial constraints, but asymmetric
information on costs. Applying the Revelation Principle (Myerson (1982), Myerson
(1986)), a procurement contract is a long-term contract which stipulates transfers
and quantities to both firms in each period. Each period’s transfers (tiC , tiS) and
17Although this paper presents a setting with convex costs a` la Auriol and Laffont (1992) and
McGuire and Riordan (1995) where dual sourcing is efficient, it is not a paper to motivate dual
sourcing per se and the results would also go through in an auction model where the contract
specifies each firm’s probability of being awarded the project. In that case the two sides of (2)
would be compared and the firm with the lowest marginal cost would provide q¯i.
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quantities (qiC , qiS) are contingent on firms’ announcements θ˜ik in that period.
18
Formally, the procurement contract can be written
{
q1C(θ˜1), q1S(θ˜1), t1C(θ˜1), t1S(θ˜1),
{
q2C(θ˜2), q2S(θ˜2), t2C(θ˜2), t2S(θ˜2)
}}
.
The timing of the game is as follows:. The procurement agency commits to a long-
term procurement contract. Firms then pay their fixed cost D and, at the beginning
of each period, types for this period are privately observed. Firms announce their
type, and transfers and quantities according to the procurement contract take place.
This is illustrated in the following timeline.
Period 0
Procurement
Contract
Firms pay
D
Learn
θ1
Period 1
(t1, q1) Learn
θ2
Period 2
(t2, q2)
Focusing on dominant strategy incentive compatibility19, the procurement agency’s
optimization problem can be formalized as
min
(tik(·),qik(·))i=1,2,k=C,S
Eθ1,θ2
[∑
i=1,2
(tiC(θi) + tiS(θi))
]
subject to
Πik(θi) ≡ piik(θik, θi) ≡ tik(θi)− C (θik, qik(θi)) ≥ 0,
θ1k ∈ argmax
θˆ1k
(
pi1k(θˆ1k, θ1) + Eθ2 [pi2k(θ2)]
)
,
θ2k ∈ argmax
θˆ2k
pi2k(θˆ2k, θ2),
qiS(θi) = q¯i − qiC(θi),
18See footnote 14.
19In these models, with only Bayesian incentive compatibility there is an infinity of solutions to
the value of transfers of which one is also incentive compatible in dominant strategies. Requiring
dominant strategies allows us to focus on one particular transfer. Pinning down the exact transfer
function will be important when analyzing the effect of the financial contract.
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where i ∈ {1, 2}, (k, j) ∈ {C, S}2, k 6= j.
The solution to the above optimization problem is characterized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume ∆θ + 1
fk(θ¯)
< µq¯i, k ∈ {C, S}. The optimal procurement
contract when no firm is financially constrained is such that both firms produce at
the same virtual marginal cost (see Myerson (1981)):
VMC (θiC , qiC(θi)) = VMC (θiS, q¯i − qiC(θi)) , (3)
where for k ∈ {C, S}, i ∈ {1, 2} VMC is defined as
VMC (θik, qik(θi)) ≡
∂C(θik, qik(θi))
∂qik
+
Fk
fk
(θik). (4)
In each period, the solution to (3) is such that the virtual marginal cost of the
cash-constrained firm for producing qiC(θi) equals the virtual marginal cost of the
self-financed firm for producing qiS(θi). This is illustrated in the following figure (for
equal cost distributions and where dashed lines represent marginal costs).
qiC
VMC(θiC , qiC)
qiS
VMC(θiS , qiS)
qiC(θi)
qiS(θi)
Figure 2: Optimal provision rule without financial constraints (θiS > θiC)
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With only one firm and a fixed quantity to be procured, it is immediate to check
that there is no possibility of getting the firm to truthfully reveal its cost and the
firm’s (monopoly) rents are high. The effect of having two firms is clearly that now
the firm can be given incentives to reveal its costs and although an information rent
has to be paid, this lowers expected costs for the principal.
Furthermore, when firms differ in their efficiency, the procurement agency will
give more than half of the provision to the more efficient firm. Compared to the
solution with complete information, under asymmetric information the share of pro-
duction attributed to the more efficient firm is further increased by the information
rent. By shifting an even larger part of the provision from the less efficient firm to
the more efficient firm, the procurement agency minimizes the required information
rent. Finally, the more the firms differ in their types θik, the more the quantities
they are asked to provide differ. As in Myerson (1981), when types are drawn from
different distributions, the optimal allocation rule might not be efficient. In other
words, if FC(·) 6= FS(·), then a low virtual marginal cost does not necessarily imply
a low marginal cost (not illustrated in the figure above).
This proposition encompasses several results that are known from the literature.
It shows that the dynamic contracting problem with independent cost reduces to
two sequential static contracting problems and the results of Baron and Myerson
(1982) and Auriol and Laffont (1992) still hold. It can also be seen as a multi-agent
version of a particular case of Baron and Besanko (1984). Because of the convexity
of costs, as in Auriol and Laffont (1992) it is not necessarily efficient to allocate the
whole provision to only one firm. In the sequel the focus will be on how the financial
structure of firms affects the procurement agency’s provision rule, and how and when
this rule differs from an ex ante symmetric treatment of firms as in (3).
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4 Procurement with both self-financed and cash-
constrained firms
4.1 Contracts and Timing
This section focuses on the case where the procurement agency does not offer financial
support.20 Firms that lack financial resources must therefore contract separately
with their investors. Consequently, there are two distinct contracts that need to be
characterized: the optimal procurement contract and the optimal financial contract.
As in previous sections a procurement contract is a long-term contract which
stipulates transfers to both firms and the associated quantities to be produced by
the two firms in each period. Formally, the procurement contract can be written as
{
q1C(θ˜1), q1S(θ˜1), t1C(θ˜1), t1S(θ˜1),
(
qn2C(θ˜2), q
n
2S(θ˜2), t
n
2C(θ˜2), t
n
2S(θ˜2)
)
n=d,m
}
,
where n describes whether both firms are still active in the second period (duopoly
situation with superscript d) or whether the self-finance firm is in a monopoly situ-
ation (superscript m). n is observable and verifiable between periods.21
A cash-constrained firm will have to finance its fixed costs by entering into a
financial contract with an investor. Without asymmetric information, a financial
contract between the investor and the cash-constrained firm would simply be a shar-
ing rule of realized profits that covers the investor’s investment cost. However, in
reality, a financial contract generally includes a risk of punishment if the repayment
is not sufficiently high. This possibility is allowed for by assuming that the financial
contract cannot be directly contingent on the procurement contract and the outcome
of the procurement contract is therefore non-contractible.22 Once a firm has realized
20See Section 4.4 for the case of state financing.
21A firm closing its doors and letting go of its employees is assumed to be a publicly observable
event. While costs can be hidden from other players, bankruptcy is assumed to be a major event
which in reality is likely to be talked about in the media and by the concerned employees and it is
therefore not hidden information.
22See Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) for a list of reasons for contracts not being profit-contingent.
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its profits, it needs to be induced to repay the investor rather than to strategi-
cally default on its repayment. As in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Faure-Grimaud
(1997) and Faure-Grimaud (2000), a financial contract therefore stipulates a repay-
ment scheme for the first period, a non-liquidation probability as well as a repayment
scheme for the second period. Formally, a financial contract is a menu
{
R1(pˆi1C), (R2(pˆi1C , pˆi2C)), β(pˆi1C)
}
,
where R1(pˆi1C) is the repayment in period 1 for a firm announcing profit level pˆi1C ,
R2(pˆi1C , pˆi2C) is the repayment in period 2 for a firm announcing profit level pˆi1C in
the first period and pˆi2C in the second period, and, finally, β(pˆi1C) is the probability
of non-liquidation before the second period following the announcement pˆi1C .
23 If a
firm strategically defaults on its repayment in the first period, it can be punished by
not being allowed to remain active in the second period.24
The timing of the game is summarized in the following figure.
Period 0
Procurement
Contract
Financial
Contract
Pay
D
Learn
θ1
Period 1
(t1, q1) (R1, β) Learn
θ2
Period 2
(t2, q2) R2
At the beginning of the game the procurement agency commits to a long-term
procurement contract. Then the cash-constrained firm negotiates a financial contract
with the investor and firms pay the fixed cost D. At the beginning of each of the two
provision periods, active firms privately learn their type and privately announce their
type to the procurement agency. Next the outcome of this period’s procurement stage
is realized. In order to honor its financial contract, an active cash-constrained firm
23Note that the only reason for which the investor would want information on the realization of
the procurement contract and the cost parameter of the firm is because it allows him to deduce the
profit level of the cash-constrained firm. Therefore instead of assuming that the financial contract
depends on the firms’ announcement of the procurement contract, a different approach is taken
where the financial contract is contingent on the (announced) profit level of the cash-constrained
firm.
24An extension of the model where transfers and quantities from the procurement contract are
contractible is studied in Subsection 4.4.
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announces its realized profits to the investor and makes its repayment. At the end of
the first period, the financial contract determines whether the cash-constrained firm
is allowed to remain active or not.
Given the sequential nature of the timing, this paper characterizes the sub-game
perfect equilibrium of this game.
4.2 Optimal financial contract
Since there is competition between investors, the optimal financial contract maxi-
mizes the firm’s expected inter-temporal profit subject to the incentive compatibility,
limited liability and investor’s individual rationality constraints.
For ease of notation Πd2C denotes the cash-constrained firm’s ex ante expected
profit in the second-period procurement contract when both firms remain active.
Since Π1C(θ1) = t1C(θ1)−C (θ1C , q1C(θ1)), we can define the cumulative distribution
function of Π1C as G(pi1C) = Prob{Π1C(θ1) ≤ pi1C}. The associated density function
is g(pi1C). The support of Π1C is [Π1C , Π¯1C ] where Π¯1C = maxΠ1C(θ1) and Π1C =
minΠ1C(θ1). Both Π1C and Π
d
2C are endogenous and will be determined by the
procurement stage.
Formally, the optimization problem writes
max
{R1(),R2(),β()}
∫ Π¯1C
0
[
Π1C − R1(Π1C) + β(Π1C)[Π
d
2C − EΠ2C [R2(Π1C ,Π2C)]]
]
dG(Π1C)
subject to
R1(Π1C) ≤ Π1C , (5)
R2(Π1C ,Π2C) ≤ Π1C −R1(Π1C), (6)
Π1C ∈ argmax
Πˆ1C
Π1C − R1(Πˆ1C) + β(Πˆ1C)
[
Πd2C − R2(Πˆ1C)
]]
, (7)
∫ Π¯1C
0
[
R1(Π1C) + β(Π1C)
(
R2(Π1C)−D
)]
dG(Π1C) ≥ D. (8)
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Notice that since the investor has no means of eliciting any information on Π2
25,
the second-period limited liability constraint in (6) needs to be true for all Π2, i.e.
the second-period repayment has to be independent of Π2. Any positive value of
R2(Π1,Π2) = R2(Π1) can therefore be shifted to the first-period repayment.
The solution to this optimization is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. (Faure-Grimaud (2000))
The optimal financial contract
{
R1(pˆi1C), R2(pˆi1C , pˆi2C), β(pˆi1C)
}
takes the form of
a debt contract with all R2(.) normalized to zero. In other words,
• If the firm makes high enough profits, it reimburses a fixed amount pi∗1C and is
never liquidated.
∀Π1C ≥ pi
∗
1C , β(Π1C) = 1 and R1(Π1C) = pi
∗
1C . (9)
• If profits are not high enough, the firm has to repay all its profits and the
probability of refinancing is less than one.
∀Π1C ≤ pi
∗
1C , β(Π1C) = 1−
pi∗1C − Π1C
Πd2C
< 1 and R1(Π1C) = Π1C . (10)
The fixed repayment is given by the following equation
pi∗1C −
∫ pi∗
1C
Π
1C
G(pi1C)dpi1C = D. (11)
This proposition reproduces the result of Faure-Grimaud (2000) who show that
the optimal financial contract takes the form of a debt contract. The optimal financial
contract described in Proposition 2 holds for a given distribution of profits. In this
paper, the difference compared to Faure-Grimaud (2000) is that profits, Π1C , are
endogenous and are determined by the procurement contract.
25The firm always has an incentive to claim Π2 = 0.
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4.3 Optimal procurement contract
This section characterizes the optimal procurement contract. Since bankruptcy is a
public event, if in the second period only the self-financed firm is left on the market, it
necessarily provides q¯2. In this case incentive compatibility and individual rationality
imply that
tm2S = C(θ¯, q¯2) (12)
and therefore Πm2S(θ2S) = (θ¯ − θ2S)q¯2.
In the case where both firms remain active in the second period, individual ra-
tionality and incentive compatibility for k ∈ {C, S} can be written as follows.26
Π2k(θ2) ≡ pi
d
2k(θ2k, θ2) = t2k(θ2)− C(θ2k, q2k(θ2)) ≥ 0, (13)
θ2k ∈ argmax
θˆ2k
pid2k(θˆ2k, θ2). (14)
Denote by Πd2k ≡ Eθ2 [Π
d
2k(θ2)] firm k’s expected profits in the second period
when the two firms remain active and by Πm2S ≡ Eθ2 [Π
m
2S(θ2)] the self-financed firm’s
expected profit when it is the only active firm.
For the cash-constrained firm, incentive compatibility in the first-period requires
that ∀θ1,
θ1C ∈ argmax
θˆ1C
pi1C(θˆ1C , θ1)− R1(pi1C(θˆ1C , θ1)) + β(pi1C(θˆ1C , θ1))Π
d
2C , (15)
with pi1k(θˆ1k, θ1) = t1k(θˆ1k, θ1j)− C(θ1k, q1k(θˆ1k, θ1j)), k ∈ {C, S}.
The following lemma greatly simplifies the cash-constrained firm’s first-period
incentive-compatibility constraint.
Lemma 1. ∀θ1, the incentive-compatibility condition in (15) can be replaced by
θ1C ∈ argmax
θˆ1C
pi1C(θˆ1C , θ1). (16)
26Because monopoly transfers and quantities are always fixed and only duopoly variables vary
with θ2, superscript “d” is dropped on transfers and quantities.
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Because the financial contract is also incentive compatible, the indirect effect
of the announcement θ1C in the procurement contract is zero. When the cash-
constrained firm considers how its announcement of first-period costs influences its
intertemporal profits, it only considers the direct effect of the announcement on first-
period profits. The financial contract with its repayments and liquidation probability
does not influence the cash-constrained firm’s incentives in the procurement contract.
Incentive compatibility for the self-financed firm can be written as, ∀θ1,
θ1S ∈ argmax
θˆ1S
pi1S(θˆ1S , θ1) + Π
m
2S − β(pi1C(θ1C , θˆ1S))
[
Πm2S − Π
d
2S
]
. (17)
The expected profit of the self-financed firm depends on the financial contract of
the cash-constrained firm. If the self-financed firm understates its cost in the first-
period, it decreases the profits of the cash-constrained firm since in this situation more
production goes to the self-financed firm and thus less to the cash-constrained firm.
This reduces the value of β(Π1C(θ1)) and therefore understating θ1S may increase
the self-financed firm’s expected profit from the second-period because it increases
the likelihood of the self-financed firm becoming a monopoly in the second period
and thus expected second-period profits.
Even if there is no direct externality of the financial contract from the cash-
constrained firm, there is an indirect externality from the self-financed firm who has
an incentive to accept a lower transfer to undertake the project in order to increase
the chances of having monopoly power in the second period. This will be of crucial
importance for obtaining the properties of the procurement contract.
Finally, first-period individual rationally requires
Π1k(θ1) ≥ 0. (18)
The procurement agency’s optimization problem can be written as
min
(tik(·),qik(·))i=1,2,k=C,S
Eθ1,θ2
[ ∑
k=C,S
(t1k(θ1) + β(Π1C(θ1))t2k(θ2)) + (1− β(Π1C(θ1)))C(θ¯, q¯2)
]
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subject to (12)-(14), (16)-(18) and qiS(θi) = q¯i − qiC(θi), i ∈ {1, 2}.
The next two propositions characterize the solution to this optimization problem.
Proposition 3. When both firms remain active in the second period, then the second-
period procurement (q2C(θ2), q2S(θ2)) is given by
MC(θ2C , q2C(θ2)) +
FC
fC
(θ2C) = MC(θ2S , q2S(θ2)) +
Eθ1C
[
β(Π1C(θ1C , θ¯))
]
Eθ1 [β(Π1C(θ1))]
FS
fS
(θ2S).
(19)
The equation in Proposition 3 states that when both firms remain active in the
second period, they produce at the same virtual marginal cost, except that the
self-financed firm’s informational rent is weighted by a value that is greater than
one.27 This implies that when both firms remain active in the second period, the
cash-constrained firm receives a higher share of the contract than when firms are
symmetric in terms of financial constraints.
This is illustrated in the following figure (for equal cost distributions and where
the dashed line represents VMC2S(·)).
27In the appendix it can be seen that the second-order condition for incentive compatibility
requires q1C(θ1) to be decreasing in θ1C . Since q1S(θ1) = q¯1 − q1C(θ1), this means that q1C(θ1)
is increasing in θ1S . First-period profits Π1C(θ1) =
∫ θ¯
θ1C
q1C(s, θ1S)ds are therefore such that
Π1C(θ1C , θ¯) ≥ Π1C(θ1), ∀θ1. Finally, since β(·) is increasing in profits, it is straightforward to
conclude that
Eθ
1C
[β(Π1C(θ1C ,θ¯))]
Eθ1 [β(Π1C(θ1))]
≥ 1 and therefore that the second-period rule shifts more of the
provision to the cash-constrained firm than the rule in (3).
17
q2C
VMC(θ2C , q2C)
q2S
Modified VMC(θ2S , q2S)
q2C(θ2)
q2S(θ2)
Figure 3: Optimal second-period provision rule (θ2S > θ2C)
So even though, in the second period, all active firms are symmetric in terms of
(no) bankruptcy-risk, when taking into account the dynamic aspect of the procure-
ment, a new reason for favoritism arises. First-period financial asymmetries carry
over to the second-period in the form an asymmetric decision rule. In fact, favor-
ing the cash-constrained firm in future procurement reduces the self-financed firm’s
expected future profits and therefore reduces the self-financed firm’s required first-
period payment. As shown in the next proposition, the first-period procurement
contract reflects the trade-off between reduced first-period costs from giving the self-
financed firm incentives to push the weak player out of the market and increased
future competition by favoring the financially weak player.
Proposition 4. The first-period procurement rule is characterized by the following
equations:
• If θ1C ≤ θ
∗
1C(θ1S) then the optimal quantity q1C(θ1) satisfies:
VMC (θ1S , q¯1 − q1C(θ1)) = VMC (θ1C , q1C(θ1)) . (20)
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• If θ1C > θ
∗
1C(θ1S) then the optimal quantity q1C(θ1) satisfies:
VMC (θ1S , q¯1 − q1C(θ1)) = VMC (θ1C , q1C(θ1)) +
1
Πd2C
FC
fC
(θ1C)P, (21)
where
P ≡ Eθ2
[ ∑
k=C,S
C (θ2k, q2k(θ2)) +
FC
fC
(θ2C)q2C(θ2)− C (θ2S , q¯2)
]
. (22)
• If θ1C = θ¯, then the optimal quantity q1C(θ1C , θ¯) satisfies
VMC (θ1S, q¯1 − q1C(θ1)) = VMC (θ1C , q1C(θ1)) +
1
Πd2C
F
f
(θ1C)P˜ , (23)
where
P˜ ≡ P + Eθ2
[ ∑
k=C,S
(
C (θ2k, q2k(θ2)) +
Fk
fk
(θ2k)q2k(θ2)
)
− C
(
θ¯, q¯2
)]
. (24)
First of all, notice that Proposition 4 states that if the cash-constrained firm is
sufficiently efficient, then it is optimal offer the same unbiased procurement rule as
in the case where firms are symmetric in their financial structure (Proposition 1).
However, when the cash-constrained firm is not sufficiently efficient compared to
its competitor, there is a trade-off between reduced first-period costs by giving the
self-financed firm incentives to push the weak player out of the market and increased
competition by favoring the financially weak player. This trade-off can be subdivided
into three effects:
• Sampling effect: Favor the cash-constrained firm to benefit from an increased
probability of low provision costs in the second-period.
• Dual sourcing effect: Favor the cash-constrained firm to benefit from the pos-
sibility of dual sourcing in the future.
• Predation effect: Favor the self-financed firm to save on first-period transfers.
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Finally, because of the incentive-compatibility requirement of q1S(θ1), it is shown
in the appendix that θ1S = θ¯ acts as a special case. The effects in the case above still
apply, but by further favoring the cash-constrained firm, the first-period payment for
all values of θ1S can be reduced.
The optimal first-period rule when θ1C > θ
∗
1C(θ1S) is illustrated in the following
figure (where dashed lines represent VMCiC(·)).
qiC
Modified VMC(θiC , qiC)
qiS
VMC(θiS , qiS)
qiC(θi)
qiS(θi)
(a) P < 0
qiC
Modified VMC(θiC , qiC)
qiS
VMC(θiS , qiS)
qiC(θi)
qiS(θi)
(b) P > 0
Figure 4: Optimal first-period provision rule (θ1C > θ
∗
1C(θ1S))
Remark: This section has characterized the optimal financial contract and the
optimal procurement contract. Furthermore, the next lemma states that at equilib-
rium, the debt contract is not such that the cash-constrained firm always repays a
fixed amount. For high enough θ1C , there will always be a non-zero risk of liquidation.
Corollary 1. ∃θ1, β(Π1C(θ1)) < 1.
This implies that the bias in the first-period procurement is non-zero when the
cash-constrained firm is relatively inefficient and thus the financial structure of firms
matters for the design of the procurement contract.
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4.4 Extensions and discussion
4.4.1 State financing
Assume that the procurement agency can provide financial support to the cash-
constrained firm. A contract offered by this integrated principal is then a mechanism
that can be written as{
q1C(θ˜1), q1S(θ˜1), t1C(θ˜1), t1S(θ˜1), β(θ˜1),
(
qn2C(θ˜2), q
n
2S(θ˜2), t
n
2C(θ˜2), t
n
2S(θ˜2)
)
n=d,m
}
,
where (ti, qi) are the transfers and quantities from the procurement contract for
period i. In the second period transfers and quantities depend on whether both
firms are still active (superscript d) or whether the self-finance firm is an a monopoly
situation (superscript m). β is the non-liquidation probability of the financially weak
firm.
The timing of the game remains the same as in Section 3 except that since the
procurement agency is also funding the participation of the cash-constrained firm,
it can also make a decision regarding the liquidation of this firm.28 The timing is
illustrated below.
Period 0
Procurement
Contract
Payment
of D
Learn
θ1
Period 1
(t1, q1) β Learn
θ2
Period 2
(t2, q2)
The analysis of the second-period constraints presented in Section 4.3 (resulting
in the constraints given by (12)-(14)) still apply. First-period individual rationally
28This is somewhat artificial and could be replaced by putting second-period transfers and quan-
tities equal to zero. However, to make the comparison to the main result simpler, the probability
of non-liquidation β(·) is used.
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and incentive compatibility require that ∀θ1, k ∈ {C, S}
Π1k(θ1) ≥ 0, (25)
θ1C ∈ argmax
θˆ1C
pi1C(θˆ1C , θ1) + β(θˆ1C , θ1S)Π
d
2C , (26)
θ1S ∈ argmax
θˆ1S
pi1S(θˆ1S, θ1)− β(θ1C , θˆ1S)
(
Πm2S −Π
d
2S
)
+Πm2S. (27)
The procurement agency’s optimization problem can be written as
min
(tik(·),qik(·))i=1,2,k=C,S
Eθ1,θ2
[ ∑
k=C,S
(
t1k(θ1) + β(θ1)t
d
2k(θ2)
)
+ (1− β(θ1))t
m
2S
]
subject to (12)-(14), (25)-(27) and qiS(θi) = q¯i − qiC(θi), i ∈ {1, 2}.
In the Appendix it is shown that the optimal procurement contract offered by
the integrated principal has the following properties.
Proposition 5. Assume ∆θ+ 1
fk(θ¯)
< µq¯i, k ∈ {C, S}. When the procurement agency
can also provide financial support to the cash-constrained firm, then dual sourcing is
optimal and the optimal procurement contract has the following characteristics:
• The cash-constrained firm is always refinanced: ∀θ1 ∈ Θ
2, β(θ1) = 1.
• Both firms produce at the same virtual marginal cost as described in (3).
Proposition 5 shows that when one firm is financially constrained, then the cost of
subsidizingD for the cash-constrained firm without threatening it with bankruptcy, is
outweighed by the gains from lower expected costs and increased future competition.
4.4.2 Pre-bidding subsidies
One question that has not yet been addressed is the optimality of a pre-bidding
subsidy of (parts of) D for both firms. Let D˜ be the total pre-bidding costs of each
firm and denote by γ the proportion of this cost that is subsidized by the procurement
agency. With this notation, D = (1 − γ)D˜. What proportion γ of the pre-bidding
cost should the procurement agency subsidize? In fact, when the procurement agency
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commits to a pre-bidding subsidy γD˜, this has two effects on its expected costs. First,
it has a direct effect in that it increases costs because the procurement agency has
to pay γD˜ to each firm. Second, it has an indirect effect that reduces second-period
expected costs for the procurement agency. Since a subsidy decreases the share of the
fixed cost that is borne by the firms, it reduces the amount that the cash-constrained
firm needs to borrow. A lower loan implies a lower repayment, and the probability
that the cash-constrained firm can reimburse and remain active in the second period
increases.29 Without further restrictions on the environment, it is not possible to
conclude which effect dominates. However, this would be an interesting question for
future work, as it would link the current paper to Gal et al. (2007) who find that
partially funding bidders’ bid-preparation costs virtually always pays off. However,
in contrast to Gal et al. (2007), the subsidy in this setting is constant across firms
and it might be optimal to subsidize all or none of the pre-bidding costs.
4.4.3 Contractibility
In the previous analysis, an important assumption is that the financial contract
cannot be directly contingent on the procurement contract. If both quantities and
transfers are observed and made contractible, then the investor (and any outside
agent) has enough information to deduce the realized value of θ1 and thus also to
deduce the realized value of profits. As pointed out in Faure-Grimaud (1997) and
Faure-Grimaud (2000), when there is no asymmetric information on realized profits,
the optimal financial contract would simply stipulate a sharing rule of realized profits
and there would be no need for (inefficient) bankruptcy risk. In this configuration,
the optimal procurement contract is characterized by Proposition 1.
By simply making the procurement contract public (contractible) information,
the procurement agency can ensure that financial constraints play no role and the
optimal procurement contract reverts to the static second-best contract. In the
case where the procurement agency cannot provide financial support to the cash-
constrained firm, it can choose to either provide a pre-bidding subsidy to all firms or
29For technical details see the working paper version of this article.
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make the procurement contract public and contractible information. A pre-bidding
subsidy is costly and might not even be profitable. However by making the procure-
ment contract publicly verifiable information the procurement agency can at zero
cost increase the efficiency of its contract and revert to a contract that implements
the second-best.
5 Conclusion
This paper considers a setting where a procurement agency contracts with two po-
tential providers, of which one is initially financially weak and relies on a financial
contract with an investor. In particular, this paper shows that whenever a procure-
ment agency cannot ex ante subsidize financially weak firms and when the procure-
ment contract is not contractible information for the investor, then there is tension
between the short-term gains from lower payments required by the self-financed firm
and the long-term gains from competition. However, if possible, the procurement
agency can overcome these difficulties by making the procurement contract public
and contractible information.
On the more applied side, this paper can be seen as a contribution to the de-
bate on whether policies such as the US Small Business Act that explicitly favors
small firms are more desirable than policies such as the EU Principle of Equal Treat-
ment. It shows that when procurement contracts are not observable or contractible
to third parties and if financing the pre-bidding costs for small firms is not possible,
then favoritism and biasing the procurement rules are appropriate tools. However,
if institutions allow for it, fully financing pre-bidding costs for small firms is a su-
perior policy. Or, the procurement agency can deter predation incentives and revert
to the second-best optimal contract simply by making the procurement contract
contractible information.
This paper focuses on the case of two firms, however the results can be made
more general. As the number of firms increases, the biases decrease and tend to
zero. However, as long as the number of firms remain sufficiently low, the results in
this paper continue to hold.
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A related, albeit different question is how two procurement agencies (or firms)
would allocate their contracts between two suppliers who both face a certain
bankruptcy risk. The two procurement agencies can, through the quantities they
allocate to each supplier, influence the suppliers’ bankruptcy risk. Here, a new issue
could potentially arise: free-riding between the two procurement agencies’ “policy”
or procurement rule.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The optimal procurement contract needs to satisfy the
incentive constraints stated in the constraints of the optimization problem. As is
standard in the contracting literature, the incentive constraint will be replaced by
its first-order condition and the second-order condition will be ignored and checked
ex post. The first- and second-order conditions are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The procurement contract is incentive compatible if and only if
∂Πik(θi)
∂θik
=− qik(θi), (A.1)
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∂qik(·)
∂θik
≤ 0. (A.2)
The proof of this lemma is standard and is therefore omitted.30 The problem
where the second-order condition, (A.2), is ignored will be referred to as the relaxed
problem.
Observe that (A.1) implies that profits are non-decreasing in θik, so that the
participation constraint only binds for θ¯. Integrating (A.1) with respect to θik yields
Πik(θi) =
∫ θ¯
θik
qik(s, θij)ds, (k, j) ∈ {C, S}
2, k 6= j, i ∈ {1, 2}. (A.3)
Replacing tik(θi) by C(θik, qik(θi))+Πik(θi) in the procurement agency’s optimiza-
tion problem and simplifying, yields the following expression for the procurement
agency’s relaxed problem.
min
(qiC(·),qiS(·))i=1,2
Eθ1,θ2
[ ∑
k=S,C
∑
i=1,2
(
C (θik, qik(θi)) +
Fk
fk
(θik)qik(θi)
)]
subject to qiS(·) = q¯i − qiC(·), qik(·) ≥ 0 and qik(·) ≤ q¯i for (k, j) ∈ {C, S}
2, k 6= j
and i = 1, 2.
Ignoring the boundary conditions qik(·) ≥ 0 and qik(·) ≤ q¯i, the first-order con-
dition yields the condition given in (3). It can be checked that (3) has a solution in
[0, q¯i] when ∆θ +
1
fk(θ¯)
< µq¯i.
Furthermore, the monotone hazard rate condition ensures that the second-order
condition holds.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Incentive compatibility of the financial contract requires that ∀pi1C , −R1(pi1C) +
β(pi1C)Π
d
2C = K, where K is some constant.
31 Since this holds for every value of
30It can be found in the working paper version of this article.
31See proof of Result 1 in Faure-Grimaud (2000).
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pi1C , it holds for pi1C(θ1), ∀θ1. Incentive compatibility for the cash-constrained firm
therefore reduces to
θ1C ∈ argmax
θˆ1C
pi1C(θˆ1C , θ1) +K. (A.4)
This is equivalent to the condition given in (16).
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4: As in previous proofs, nothing changes with
regard to second-period individual rationality and incentive compatibility when both
firms are still active and in the relaxed problem these constraints can be replaced by
(A.3).
For the cash-constrained firm, Lemma 2 still applies and the participation con-
straint is binding for the least efficient type. Therefore, integrating the first-order
condition and exploiting the participation constraint yields equation (A.3).
For the self-financed firm, the first-order condition is slightly more complicated:
∂
[
Π1S(θ1) + β(Π1C(θ1))
[
Πd2S −Π
m
2S
]]
∂θ1S
= −q1S(θ1). (A.5)
The first-order condition is on the inter-temporal utility whereas the participation
condition is on the per-period profit. To use the standard techniques of contract
theory, I need to assume that the direct effect of the announcement θˆ1S of first
period profits dominates the indirect effect that works through the changes in the
cash-constrained firm’s non-liquidation probability. In other words, I assume that
∂[β(Π1C (θ1))[Πd2S−Πm2S]]
∂θ1S
is small compared to ∂[Π1S(θ1)]
∂θ1S
so that the participation constraint
is binding for the least efficient type and we can apply the same technique as for the
cash-constrained firm’s constraint to obtain the following expression for Π1S(θ1).
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Π1S(θ1) =
(
β(Π1C(θ1C , θ¯))− β(Π1C(θ1))
) (
Πd2S − Π
m
2S
)
+
∫ θ¯
θ1S
q1S(θ1C , s)ds. (A.6)
32If this is not the case, then we are in a situation similar to Lewis and Sappington (1989) where
the participation constraint binds for some interior type θ˜. If that were the case here, then that
would lead to further distortions of output (as in Lewis and Sappington (1989)). However, the
additional biases presented in Propositions 3 and 4 still hold. This paper therefore abstracts from
these further complications.
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From (A.6) it can be seen that the procurement agency has two instruments to reduce
its first-period transfer to the self-financed firm: the split between q1C(θ1) and q1S(θ1)
and the value of the second-period expected profit.
In the procurement agency’s minimization problem, replacing transfers by the
expression in (A.3) and (A.6) yields the following relaxed minimization problem.
min
(qik(·))k=C,S,i=1,2
Eθ1,θ2
[ ∑
k=C,S
V C (θ1k, q1k(θ1)) + β(Π1C(θ1))
( ∑
k=C,S
C (θ2k, q2k(θ2))
+
F
f
(θ2C)q2C(θ2)− C (θ2S , q¯2)
)
+ β(Π1C(θ1C , θ¯))
(
F
f
(θ2S)q2S(θ2)
− (θ¯ − θ2S)q¯2
)]
, (A.7)
subject to q¯i = qiC(θi) + qiS(θi), i ∈ {1, 2}.
Piecewise optimization with respect to q2C(θ2) yields the rule stated in Proposi-
tion 3. Since
Eθ
1C [β(Π1C(θ1C ,θ¯))]
Eθ1 [β(Π1C(θ1))]
is a constant with respect to θ2 and because of the
monotone hazard condition, the second-order conditions are still satisfied so that the
solution to the relaxed problem is also the solution to the initial problem.
To see where the result in Proposition 4 comes from it is necessary to solve for the
optimal first-period quantities of (A.7). To this aim, the following technical lemma
will be helpful.
Lemma 3.
Eθ1 [β(Π1C(θ1))] =1−
pi∗1C
Πd2C
+
1
Πd2C
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ∗
1C
(θ1S)
FC(θ1C)q1C(θ1)dθ1CdFS(θ1S), (A.8)
where θ∗1C(θ1S) is such that Π1C(θ
∗
1C(θ1S), θ1S) = pi
∗
1C and pi
∗
1C is defined by (11).
Proof of Lemma 3:
By using (9) and (10), Eθ1 [β(Π1(θ1))] can be expressed as
Eθ1 [β(Π1(θ1))] = 1− Eθ1S
[∫ θ¯
θ∗
1C
(θ1S)
pi∗1C − Π1C(θ1)
Πd2C
dFC(θ1C)
]
, (A.9)
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where θ∗1C(θ1S) is such that Π1C(θ
∗
1C(θ1S), θ1S) = pi
∗
1C and pi
∗
1C is defined by (11).
The distribution of θ∗1C(θ1S) is for the specific distribution of profits that is given
by the procurement contract. Since Π1C(θ1) =
∫ θ¯
θ1C
q1C(s, θ1S)ds is a decreasing
function of θ1C , G(pi1C) can be rewritten as
G(pi1C) =
∫ θ¯
θ
Prob
{
θ1C ≥ θˆ1C(θ1S , pi1C)
}
dF (θ1S) = 1−
∫ θ¯
θ
FC(θˆ1C(θ1S, pi1C))dFS(θ1S),
where θˆ1C(θ1S, pi1C) is such that Π1C(θˆ1C(θ1S,Π1C), θ1S) = pi1C .
Finally, when replacing Π1C(θ1) by
∫ θ¯
θ1C
q1C(s, θ1S)ds in (A.9) and integrating by
part, the expected value of β(Π1C(θ1)) can be expressed as (A.8).
Piecewise optimization of the regulatory agency’s problem where
Eθ1 [β(Π1C(θ1))] has been replaced by (A.8) yields the first-order conditions that are
stated in Proposition 4.
Now it only remains to verify that second-order conditions for the first-period
quantities hold. For the self-financed firm, ∀θ1,
∂q1S(θ1)
∂θ1S
= −1
2µ
(
1 +
∂
FS
fS
(θ1S )
∂θ1S
)
< 0.
And therefore, the second-order condition holds.
For the cash-constrained firm,
q1C(θ1) =
q¯1
2
+
θ1S +
FS
fS
(θ1S)− θ1C −
FC
fC
(θ1C)
2µ
−
P
2µΠd2C
FC
fC
(θ1C),
or the same expression without the last term if θ1C ≤ θ
∗
1C(θ1S). For the exact
expression of P see Proposition 4. However, the important thing is that P is constant
with respect to θ1C . This implies that,
∂q1C(θ1)
∂θ1C
=−
1
2µ
(
1 +
∂ FC
fC
(θ1C)
∂θ1C
−
P
Πd2C
∂ FC
fC
(θ1C)
∂θ1C
)
. (A.10)
So, finally, the second-order condition for the cash-constrained firm holds if and
only if the last term in (A.10) is not too positive.
Proof of Corollary 1:
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Suppose that the optimal financial debt contract is degenerate. In other words,
R1(Π1C) = pi
∗
1C and β(Π1C) = 1 regardless of the realized profits of the firm. This
implies that pi∗1C ≤ Π1C(θ¯, θ1S) = 0. However, this would violate individual rational-
ity of the investor. Thus, the optimal financial contract is not degenerate.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Compared to the proof of Proposition 1, nothing changes with regard to second-
period incentive compatibility when both firms are still active in the second period
and in this case (A.3) remains valid.
First- and second-order conditions for first-period incentive compatibility are still
given by Lemma 2, and integration by part (and using the fact that the highest
type’s participation constraint binds) yields the following expression for the cash-
constrained firm’s first-period expected profit.
Π1C(θ1) + β(θ1)Eθ2
[
FC
fC
(θ2C)q2C(θ2)
]
=
∫ θ¯
θ1C
q(s, θ1S)ds+ β(θ¯, θ1S)Eθ2
[
FC
fC
(θ2C)q2C(θ2)
]
.
Using the definition of Π1C(θ1) and rearranging terms yields the following expression
for the required first-period transfer
t1C(θ1) = C (θ1C , q1C(θ1)) +
∫ θ¯
θ1C
q(s, θ1S)ds− β(θ1)Eθ2
[
FC
fC
(θ2C)q2C(θ2)
]
+β(θ¯, θ1S)Eθ2
[
FC
fC
(θ2C)q2C(θ2)
]
.
Similarly the self-financed firm’s first-period transfer is
t1S(θ1) = C (θ1S, q1S(θ1)) +
∫ θ¯
θ1S
q1S(s, θ1C)ds− β(θ1)Eθ2
[
FS
fS
(θ2S)q2S(θ2)
]
−(1− β(θ1))Eθ2
[
(θ¯ − θ2S)q¯2
]
+ β(θ1C , θ¯)Eθ2
[
FS
fS
(θ2S)q2S(θ2)
]
+(1− β(θ1C , θ¯))Eθ2
[
(θ¯ − θ2S)q¯2
]
.
In fact, the refinancing variable β(·) modifies the continuation value for the firms
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in different ways and thus it also affects differently the transfers that they re-
quire to satisfy participation (and incentive) constraints in the initial procure-
ment stage. The principal’s relaxed problem is now to minimize, with respect to
(qik(·)i∈{1,2},k∈{C,S}, β(·)), the following expression
Eθ1,θ2
{ ∑
k∈{C,S}
[
C (θ1k, q1k(θ1)) +
Fk
fk
(θ1k)q1k(θ1) + β(θ1)
[
C (θ2k, q2k(θ2))
]]
− β(θ¯, θ1S)
FC
fC
(θ2C)q2C(θ2) + β(θ1C , θ¯)
FS
fS
(θ2S)q2S(θ2)
+ (1− β(θ1))C (θ2S , q¯2) + (1− β(θ1C , θ¯))
[
(θ¯ − θ2S)q¯2
]}
.
The problem is linear in β(·) and the derivative of the objective function with
respect to β is proportional to Eθ2 [C (θ2C , q2C(θ2)) + C (θ2S , q2S(θ2))− C(θ2S, q¯2)].
Having two firms draw second-period costs increases the chance of a low cost and
this term is therefore negative. Notice also that when costs are strictly convex,
the expected gain from having two active firms is positive and thus the term is
negative. It is therefore optimal for the procurement agency to always subsidize
the cash-constrained firm. Taking first-order conditions with respect to qik(·) yields
the conditions of equality of marginal costs as in Proposition 1. Thanks to the
monotone hazard rate condition, the second-order condition holds and the solution
to the relaxed problem is also the solution to the initial problem.
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